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Abstract
Validating wireless protocol implementations is chal-
lenging. Today’s approaches require labor-intensive ex-
perimental setup and manual trace investigation, but pro-
duce poor coverage and inaccurate and irreproducible re-
sults. We present VERIFI, the first systematic sniffer-
based, model-guided runtime verification framework for
wireless protocol implementations. VERIFI takes a for-
mal model of the protocol being verified as input. To
achieve good coverage, it first applies state reachabil-
ity analysis by applying model checking techniques. It
then uses a new PACKETSNIPER component to selec-
tively trigger packet losses required to quickly investi-
gate all reachable protocol states. Our results show that
the selective packet jamming allows VERIFI to signifi-
cantly improve the coverage of protocol states. Finally,
VERIFI accommodates uncertainty caused by the sniffer
when validating traces, allowing it to provide accurate
and reproducible results. By modeling uncertainty, VER-
IFI highlights likely protocol violations for developers to
examine.
1 INTRODUCTION
The rapid increase in the number of mobile and cus-
tom wireless devices is making wireless protocols in-
creasingly important. Wireless protocols specifications
undergo extensive testing, typically through simulations.
But a lack of good tools results in protocol implementa-
tions not being tested as carefully as protocol specifica-
tions. Implementations can always introduce bugs, par-
ticularly when development is done by parties that did
not author the specification. Given the rise of custom
wireless devices—such as Apple TVs, XBox controllers,
ChromeCasts, and FitBits—effective testing of wireless
protocol implementations is more important today than
ever before. These devices frequently implement cus-
tom and sometimes proprietary wireless protocols. The
implementation may itself be proprietary, making source
code unavailable to the party performing validation. And
they may lack capabilities required to do white-box test-
ing. A series of connectivity flaws in deployed devices
and systems—including Apple Watch 3 [24], iOS 8 [11],
Google Android Lollipop [17], and the Microsoft Sur-
face Pro 3 [8]—help demonstrate that a new approach to
wireless protocol implementation verification is needed.
Formal model checking techniques have been used to
verify the correctness of wired communication protocol
implementations [25, 14] and distributed systems [15,
9, 22]. But there are several unique features that make
verifying wireless protocol implementations more chal-
lenging. Wireless protocols confront a more complex
and dynamic environment than their wired counterparts.
Environment variables—such as attenuation, multi-path,
fading, and interference—are hard to control, making re-
producible experimentation difficult. To meet tight tim-
ing constraints, wireless protocols are often implemented
in low level firmware. This makes it difficult to apply
source code model checking techniques. Finally, due to
closed-source implementations, validation often must be
done using external wireless sniffers. Due to the physical
nature of the wireless medium, sniffers introduce uncer-
tainty that can sabotage the validation results.
The result of these difficulties is that no systematic
testing or verification system for wireless protocol im-
plementations currently exists. Current state-of-the-art
industry practices begins with labor-intensive conducted
test setup. Manual spot-checking is then used to inspect
packet traces collected by the sniffer and validate im-
plementation correctness. The process is tedious, error-
prone and time-consuming, but also misses many proto-
col states resulting in poor test coverage.
In this paper, we describe the design and implementa-
tion of VERIFI: the first systematic sniffer-based, model-
guided runtime verification framework for wireless pro-
tocol implementations. While VERIFI could be extended
to study timing-related failures, it currently focuses on
implementation bugs caused by packet loss. Factors such
as interference and fading make packet loss normal in
wireless communications. A core task of wireless proto-
cols is handling packet loss, and VERIFI can help vali-
date that they do so correctly.
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VERIFI requires both a model of the protocol specifi-
cation and access to the devices being tested. The model
consists of state machines for portions of the protocol
that require verification, such as association, rate con-
trol, and retransmission policies. During testing, VER-
IFI manipulates communication with the tested device
to ensure that it quickly reaches all reachable protocol
states. It accomplishes this using two novel components.
A protocol model analyzer determines packet loss se-
quences that can drive the protocol model into various
states. The PACKETSNIPER uses these sequences to de-
termine if a packet currently in the air should be lost to
reach an untested state. If so, it prevents packet reception
by generating a jamming signal.
Once testing is complete, a trace verifier analyzes
recorded packet exchanges to identify protocol viola-
tions. VERIFI can distinguish likely implementation
bugs from false positions that were probably caused by
sniffer uncertainty. This produces a clear work flow
for helping developers bring their implementation in line
with the specification.
Our work makes the following contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, VERIFI is the first au-
tomatic and systematic framework for end-to-end val-
idation of wireless protocol implementations.
• By formally describing the model of wireless proto-
cols, we use model checking techniques to automati-
cally infer the packet reception and loss sequences that
drive the model and implementation into target states.
• We describe the design principles and two prototype
implementations of PACKETSNIPER for Wi-Fi sys-
tems, which selectively drop the packets specified by
the protocol model analyzer.
• We propose a new method of validating sniffer traces
under uncertainty (as observed in [30]). By incorporat-
ing sniffer as part of our model, the sniffer trace uncer-
tainty can be tackled by an off-the-shelf model checker
(instead of a specialized checker [30]).
• We perform an end-to-end evaluation of our frame-
work using the 802.11 link setup protocol. It demon-
strates that VERIFI significantly improves test cover-
age, efficiency, and reproducibility. We also report
three implementation issues VERIFI discovered that
do not manifest otherwise.
While we believe that VERIFI is a general approach
that can validate many different wireless protocol imple-
mentations, this paper focuses on Wi-Fi based systems.
2 VALIDATION FRAMEWORK
We use the Wi-Fi link setup protocol as a concrete ex-
ample to illustrate the work flow of our validation frame-
work. The detailed protocol is explained in Section 2.1.
s0 s1 s2
s3
TX(AUTH_REQ) RX(CLIENT_ACK)
RX(AUTH_RESP)
s4
TX(AP_ACK)
TX(AUTH_REQ’)
RX(AUTH_RESP’)
Init
Authenticated
(a) Client State Machine for the Authentication Step.
PKT’ denotes the MAC layer retransmissions of PKT.
t1 t2
t3
RX(AUTH_REQ) TX(CLIENT_ACK)
TX(AUTH_RESP)RX(AP_ACK)
TX(AUTH_RESP’)
t4
t0
RX(AUTH_REQ’)
Init
Authenticated
(b) AP State Machine for the Authentication Step.
Figure 1: 802.11 Link Setup Protocol and State Ma-
chines.
We then describe three key observations from the exam-
ple protocol in Section 2.2 and show an overview of our
validation framework in Section 2.3.
2.1 Example Protocol
The Wi-Fi link setup protocol consists of three phases:
authentication, association and 802.11X authentication.
Figure 1a shows the client’s state machine for the au-
thentication phase. The client first sends AUTH REQ and
expects to receive CLIENT ACK (s0 → s1). Either it
receives CLIENT ACK and then waits for AUTH RESP
(s1 → s2), or it retransmits AUTH REQ and remains at
s1. Once it receives both the CLIENT ACK and the
AUTH RESP packet, it moves to the Authenticated
state s4. The client then continues to start the associ-
ation request/response handshake process, the detailed
state machines of which are omitted for sake of space.
In Figure 1b, when the AP receives AUTH REQ or its
retransmission, it first acknowledges the request (t1→ t2),
and then replies with AUTH RESP. Similarly, multiple
retransmissions of AUTH RESPmay occur before the AP
receives AP ACK, and is ready to handle the association
request from this client. The AP may have several such
state machines running in parallel to handle the authenti-
cation requests from multiple clients.
2.2 Key Observations
We make several observations from the example proto-
col described in Section 2.1. First, wireless protocols can
be modeled as a collection of state machines that interop-
erate with each other via packet exchanges. In particular,
each end device can be treated as a black box and the in-
puts of the state machine are limited to only externally
observable events: what (and when) packet is transmit-
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Figure 2: VERIFI Framework for Verifying Wireless
Protocol Implementations. Components in bold face
are proposed and described by this paper. DUT stands
for Device Under Test.
ted. This constraint not only simplifies the protocol anal-
ysis and verification, but also has practical benefits. As
explained earlier, the implementations of wireless proto-
cols are often proprietary, making observing end-points’
internal states extremely difficult if not entirely impossi-
ble. Certain wireless protocol aspects, such as the Clean
Channel Assessment (CCA) and Distributed Coordina-
tion Function (DCF), cannot be modeled in this manner
as they require access to the end device’s internal states.
Second, packet loss is the key factor that alters the end-
point behaviors in wireless protocols. Other factors, such
as out-of-order delivery and queueing delay, are less sig-
nificant in wireless protocols than their wired counter-
parts. For instance, the link setup protocol in Figure 1
becomes trivial in the absence of packet loss: each de-
vice just iterates through the three stages sequentially be-
fore both end-device reach the same associated state. In
fact, we argue that a large portion of any wireless proto-
cols is to define how the endpoints cope of packet losses:
retransmissions and acknowledgments are required to en-
sure packet delivery, rate control mechanisms are used to
improve the link performance in face of packet loss, etc.
Finally, validating wireless protocol implementations
involves driving the system to certain state, and then ob-
serve and validate the Device Under Test (DUT)’s be-
havior. The system state can be represented by a tuple
of the model state at each endpoint. For instance, in
the state machines shown in Figure 1a and 1b, the sys-
tem state 〈Client.s1,AP.t3〉 represents the case where the
client and the AP disagree with the authentication status:
the client thinks it is not authenticated and is trying to
retransmit the AUTH REQ packet, while the AP actually
receives the AUTH REQ packet and is trying to transmit
the AUTH RESP packet.
2.3 Framework Overview
Based on the observations, we propose VERIFI, a
model-driven runtime verification framework for wire-
less protocol implementations. Figure 2 shows main
components and the work flow of the framework.
Medium𝒎𝒌𝒎𝟐𝒎𝟏 Sniffer
Trace…
TX(PKT)
RX(PKT)
Protocol
State
Machines
T R T R T R
Figure 3: Model for Wireless Protocols. T and R rep-
resent common transmitting and receiving modules that
are reused at each state machine.
Beginning with a formal model of the protocol, the
PROTOCOLANALYZER first uses model checking tech-
niques to infer the edge sequence (packet success/loss) to
reach each system state. We describe general principles
of modeling wireless protocols and one specific realiza-
tion using UPPAAL model checker in Section 3.
The packet success/loss information is then fed to
PACKETSNIPER—a real-time reactive packet jammer.
The PACKETSNIPER drops the packets that are tagged as
loss in the policy. We describe the design and two imple-
mentations of PACKETSNIPER for 802.11 in Section 4.
Finally, packet traces are collected to verify the sys-
tem’s behavior by the TRACEVERIFIER component. As
observed in [30], sniffer trace can not directly be used for
verification due to uncertainty. We describe how VERIFI
handles sniffer trace uncertainty in Section 5.
3 PROTOCOL ANALYZER
The PROTOCOLANALYZER takes the protocol model
which consists of a set of communicating state machines,
and outputs the packet success/loss sequences to reach
each system state. We first propose a approach to model
wireless protocols (§ 3.1) and the algorithm to infer the
packet success/loss sequences (§ 3.2). We then describe
our implementation on UPPAAL model checker (§ 3.3).
3.1 Modeling Wireless Protocols
Communication in wireless medium is broadcast at
physical layer in nature—each transmitted packet can be
heard by every devices within the vicinity of the trans-
mitter. The packet contains a destination field to help
non-designating devices drop such packets and only the
indented receiver delivers the packet to upper layer. Due
to factors such as interference and fading, each packet
has a non-zero loss probability.
Based on these observations, we propose a generic
model for wireless protocols, as shown in Figure 3.
Transmitting and receiving packets are simulated by
sending to and receiving from two shared synchronous
signal buses: TX(PKT) and RX(PKT). The wireless
medium is modeled as a switch that controls the suc-
cess or failure of each transmission at per-packet basis.
The wireless protocol to be modeled consists of a set
of state machines, m1,m2, . . . ,mk, that inter-operate with
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Algorithm 1 Jamming Policy Generator.
Input: protocol model M, state to reach s.
Output: jamming policy to reach the state s, or nil if the
state is not reachable.
1: procedure JAMMINGPOLICY(M, s)
2: errorState← s
3: transitions← MODELCHECKER(M, errorState)
4: if transitions = nil then
5: return nil . state s is not reachable
6: end if
7: policy← []
8: for t in transitions do
9: policy.append(〈t.pkt, t.medium switch〉)
10: end for
11: return policy
12: end procedure
each other via the two communication buses. The proto-
col state is a tuple of all the states at each state machine,
i.e., 〈m1.state,m2.state, . . . ,mk.state〉.
Assuming that the protocol itself is deterministic, the
only non-determinism in the model lies in the switch in-
side the Medium module. When querying certain prop-
erties of the protocol model, such as state reachability,
the model checker tool can only manipulate this medium
switch for each packet when performing validation. The
Sniffer module is discussed in Section 5.
Note that there are two common functionalities that are
used at each end devices: transmitting and receiving a
packet. We use the T and R sub-modules to provide such
abstractions. The packet transmission sub-module (T) in-
volves managing sequence number (for de-duplication at
the receiver), waiting for acknowledgment and perform-
ing retransmission when needed. The packet reception
sub-module (R) is responsible for sending acknowledg-
ment packet and packet de-duplication. These two sub-
modules, together with the Medium and Sniffermod-
els, are protocol independent and can be provided as part
of the verification framework.
The ability of modeling broadcast packets (such as
beacons in 802.11) is limited in our current formula-
tion. Since there is only one medium switch for all re-
ceivers, the broadcast packet can only be either received
or missed by all devices. While in reality, the broad-
cast packet may be received by a subset of devices but
missed by others. However, this is not a fundamental
limitation, and can be mitigated by extending our formu-
lation and adding a medium switch to each participating
device. Without loss of generality, we focus on protocols
that only contain single-cast packets in this paper.
3.2 Jamming Policy Generation
The output of PROTOCOLANALYZER is the packet
success/loss sequences that drive the protocol model into
s0 s1
tx!m1 t0 t1
tx?m2
Figure 4: Channel Synchronization in UPPAAL.
each state. We call such sequences jamming policy, as
they provide instructions of which packet to jam or pass
for PACKETSNIPER that we will describe in Section 4.
With our proposed modeling approach, the key idea
of inferring jamming policy to reach a target state is to
reduce the problem to the well-known model checking
problem of determining if an error state s is reachable in
a model M [13].
Algorithm 1 shows the jamming policy generator algo-
rithm. In order to infer the jamming policy to reach the
target state, we instruct the model checker to verify the
property that claims the target state is not reachable (L2).
If the state is reachable, model checker will come up with
a counter example which consists of the state transitions
from the initial state to the target state. By examining the
packet and the state of medium switch associated with
the transition (L9), we can infer the jamming policy that
drives the system to target state. We then apply Algo-
rithm 1 for each system state, and obtain corresponding
jamming policies for each reachable system state.
3.3 Implementation on UPPAAL
The proposed modeling methodology of wireless pro-
tocols and algorithm for inferring jamming policies are
generic, and can be realized in any model checking tool
that provides synchronization capability between inter-
acting models. Next, we describe one implementation on
UPPAAL model checker.
3.3.1 UPPAAL Primer
UPPAAL [6, 5] is a model checking suite for verify-
ing real-time systems modeled as networks of timed au-
tomata [2]. The suite contains the UPPAAL language
specification and a model checker implemented using
constraint-solving techniques.
UPPAAL provides shared variables and synchroniza-
tion capability via channel variables, making it easy to
model packet exchange. An example is shown in Fig-
ure 4. A channel variable tx is defined to synchronize
the transitions in two state machines, m1 and m2. In par-
ticular, the s0→ s1 transition labeled as tx! in m1 syn-
chronizes with the t0 → t1 transition labeled as tx? in
m2. Therefore, a packet can be “transmitted” from m1 to
m2 by writing a shared variable in the s0→ s1 transition
in m1, and reading the same shared variable in the t0→ t1
transition in m2.
Listing 1 shows the 4 optional components of a state
transition in UPPAAL. The Selection statement non-
deterministically binds a local identifier to a value in a
given range. The state transition is enabled if and only
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
1 // transition from s_i to s_j
2 s_i -> s_j {
3 select i : int [0, 1]; // Selection
4 guard c < 5; // Guard
5 sync signal!; // Synchronization
6 assign c = 0;} // Update
Listing 1: State Transition in UPPAAL.
if the Guard statement is evaluated to true. Transitions
labeled as Synchronization pairs synchronize with each
other. For instance, a transition labeled as signal!
triggers another transition labeled as signal?. The Up-
date statements are evaluated when the transition hap-
pens. The side-effect of the Update statements update
the state of the model.
3.3.2 Modeling Using UPPAAL
Next, we show how the T, R and Medium models in
our formulation can be implemented in UPPAAL.
Listing 2 shows the UPPAAL encoding of the T, R
and Medium model in our formulation. The interface
to the T model is two synchronization channels for each
device (mac tx start and mac tx done), together
with two shared variables (pkt to send and tx ok)
for passing data. Internally the Tmodel handles sequence
number assignment, expecting acknowledgments and re-
transmissions if needed.
Similarly, the interface of the R model is one channel
(mac rx end) and one shared variable (pkt recvd)
for each device. The R model handles sending acknowl-
edgment and packet de-duplication. Both the T and R
model are parameterized with an integer identifier so that
they can be reused by multiple device models.
Inside the Medium model, for each transmitted
packet, it non-deterministically decides whether the
packet is lost (L34), and only sends the phy rx end sig-
nal if the packet not lost (L40). Therefore, the Medium
model acts as a switch between the phy tx start and
the phy rx end signals.
With the help of the T and R models, it is easy to en-
code the up layer state machines in UPPAAL language.
For instance, the encoding of s0 → s1 transition in the
client state machine is shown in Listing 3. To send the
AUTH REQ packet, the client model only needs to set
the packet to be sent (L3), then signals the correspond-
ing max tx start signal. The rest of sending logic is
handled by the T module.
3.3.3 Jamming Policy Generator
In UPPAAL, the property to be verified is expressed
using the TCTL [1] query language. In particular, given
a property φ , the query A[]φ asks whether φ holds for
all possible execution paths. This query can be used to
generate the jamming policies.

1 const int NUM_DEVICE = 2;
2
3 // interface of the T module
4 chan mac_tx_start[NUM_DEVICE]
5 pkt_t pkt_to_send[NUM_DEVICE];
6 chan mac_tx_done[NUM_DEVICE];
7 bool tx_ok[NUM_DEVICE];
8
9 process T(int id) {
10 // listen for mac_tx_start[id]
11 // and transmit pkt_to_send[id]
12 ... }
13
14 // interface of the R module
15 chan mac_rx_end[NUM_DEVICE];
16 pkt_t pkt_recvd[NUM_DEVICE];
17
18 process R(int id) {
19 // listen for the phy_rx_end
20 // and trigger mac_rx_end[id] on
21 // packet received
22 ... }
23
24 // interface of the Medium module
25 chan phy_tx_start;
26 chan phy_rx_end;
27 pkt_t pkt_in_air;
28
29 process Medium() {
30 bool loss;
31 state
32 s_init, s_got_pkt;
33 transitions
34 s_init -> s_got_pkt
35 { select i: int [0, 1];
36 sync phy_tx_start?;
37 assign loss = i == 0; },
38 s_got_pkt -> s_init
39 { guard loss; },
40 s_got_pkt -> s_init
41 { guard !loss;
42 sync phy_rx_end!; }; }
Listing 2: Modeling T, R and Medium using
UPPAAL. The body of T and R is omitted for sake of
space.

1 s_0 -> s_1 {
2 sync mac_tx_start[client_id]!;
3 assign pkt_to_send[client_id].type =
AUTH_REQ;
4 pkt_to_send[id].dest = ap_id; },
Listing 3: Example Modeling of Client
Authentication State Machine Using UPPAAL.
For instance, the A[] !(Client.s 4 &&
AP.t 4) query asserts that the system state
〈Client.s 4, AP.s 4〉 is not reachable. There
are two possible outcomes from model checking such
a property: either the answer is yes and the state is
indeed not reachable, or the answer is no and UPPAAL
will also provide one transition sequence from the initial
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Figure 5: Work Flow of PACKETSNIPER.
state to the target state. By examining the value of the
pkt in air and the Medium.loss variables at each
intermediate state, we can extract the jamming policy in
order to reach the target state.
We have implemented PROTOCOLANALYZER for UP-
PAAL using Python. It first parses the UPPAAL model to
extract the models and their states. For every combina-
tion of the model states, it generates the un-reachability
query described above and runs the UPPAAL model
checker. If the query is not satisfied (i.e., the state is
reachable), it parses the UPPAAL output and extracts the
packet success/failure sequence. The output of the PRO-
TOCOLANALYZER is a list of reachable system states and
the packet sequence in order to drive the system to the
target state.
4 PACKETSNIPER
With the jamming policy to reach each protocol state,
we now describe the design and two prototype implemen-
tations of PACKETSNIPER to execute the jamming policy.
4.1 Design Requirements
To ensure the integrity of the transmitted packets, wire-
less protocols usually include various forms of check-
sums in the packet to help the receiver to detect bit errors.
In wireless protocols such Wi-Fi, packets with checksum
errors are discarded by the receiver. The idea of PACKET-
SNIPER is to detect the beginning of packet transmission
in real time, and disrupt the transmission just in time be-
fore it ends to cause the checksum to fail at the receiver
side. Figure 5 shows the overall work flow of PACK-
ETSNIPER. The PACKETSNIPER continuously monitors
the wireless medium, and starts decoding packets upon
detection. It then performs matching of the packet with
predefined jamming policies and sends jamming signals
if the packet is labeled as failure in the policy.
To achieve this goal, the PACKETSNIPER needs to first
decode certain packet attributes, such as source, destina-
tion and packet type. Therefore, previous physical layer
jamming methods [12, 27, 20] are not applicable as they
can only blindly jam the wireless medium. The PACKET-
SNIPER then needs to transmit the jamming signal before
the original packet transmission ends in order to disrupt
the transmission. This poses very strict timing require-
ments as the duration of packet transmissions in wireless
communication is often in the order of microseconds.
Next, we first describe a set of design requirements and
challenges of PACKETSNIPER. We then describe two
prototype PACKETSNIPER implementations for 802.11
protocol on Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP)
N210 and SORA platform.
4.1.1 Jamming Latency
The PACKETSNIPER must transmit the jamming signal
before the end of packet transmission to jam the packet
at the receiver side. This requires the PACKETSNIPER
to perform the packet detection, decoding and decision
making process within a portion of the transmission du-
ration. There are several MAC protocol implementations
on Software Define Radio (SDR) platforms [26, 28].
However, the round trip latency between the SDR fron-
tend and the host PC is usually in order of hundreds of
milliseconds, which are prohibitively longer than the re-
quirements. It is clear that the core logic of PACKET-
SNIPER must be placed as close to the radio frontend as
possible to meet the tight timing requirements.
In addition, certain management or action packets,
such as the acknowledgment (ACK), Request to Send
(RTS) and Clear to Send (CTS) packets in 802.11 proto-
col, only contains very minimum protocol attributes and
no data payloads, making them extremely difficult to jam.
The PACKETSNIPER needs to take advantage of certain
protocol semantics in order to jam such short packets.
4.1.2 Protocol Attributes
PACKETSNIPER needs to decode enough protocol at-
tributes of the packet to help make the jamming deci-
sion, yet must stop decoding as early as possible so that
the jamming signal can overlap enough with the origi-
nal transmission. Therefore, the number of protocol at-
tributes to decode represents a trade-off between jam-
ming policy granularity and jamming probability. The
more attributes to decode, the more fine granularity the
jamming policy can express, yet the probability of suc-
cessfully jam the packet is lower.
4.1.3 Decoding Errors
As wireless receivers, the PACKETSNIPER could also
have decoding errors. This may cause the PACKET-
SNIPER to miss the packets to be jammed, or jam the
wrong packets. While the PACKETSNIPER should try its
best to execute the jamming policy, such jamming mis-
behaviors create uncertainty in later verification phase.
4.2 Implementation on USRP
We now describe our prototype implementation of
PACKETSNIPER for 802.11 protocol on USRP N210
SDR platform. Because of the tight timing requirements,
we choose to implement the core jamming logic in the
on-board FPGA to eliminate the long round-trip latency
suffered by most SDR implementations.
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Figure 6: USRP N210 FPGA Diagram. Our implemen-
tation is in the two bold blocks marked as 1 and 2. DD-
C/DUC stands for Digital Down/Up Converter.
The USRP N210 platform contains an on-board FPGA
for time-sensitive baseband tasks, such as I/Q balance,
digital down/up converting. The current resource uti-
lization of the N210 FPGA is only around 25%, leaving
enough room for implementing custom logic on board.
Figure 6 shows a simplified diagram of the USRP
N210 FPGA. There are two RF chains: one for receiv-
ing the RF signals and sending them to host PC (the RX
Chain), and the other for transmitting the RF signals from
host PC to the air (the TX Chain). On both RF chains,
there are stubs reserved for implementing custom logic.
By default, these stubs are only pass-through, thus have
no effect on the signal processing.
We have modified the custom stubs to implement
PACKETSNIPER, as shown in the two bold boxes labeled
as 1 and 2. In stub 1, we implemented a full 802.11a/g/n
OFDM receiver. The tasks include: short preamble de-
tection [21] and coarse frequency offset correction [31],
long preamble detection for symbol alignment and fine
frequency offset correction [31], OFDM decoding con-
sists of demodulation, deinterleaving, Viterbi decoding
and descrambling.
In addition, there is a jamming filter module in stub 1
that compares the decoded packets with pre-configured
jamming policies to determine the jamming decision.
The output of stub 1 is a binary signal, called jam. When
the jam signal is asserted, stub 2 starts transmitting pre-
configured jamming signals through the TX chain.
The overall implementation includes 4320 lines of Ver-
ilog code for FPGA implementation, and 2265 lines of
Python code for generating look up tables and cross vali-
dation of the FPGA implementation.
4.3 Implementation On SORA
Another promising SDR platform for PACKETSNIPER
is SORA [32]. Currently, SORA provides a full imple-
mentation of 802.11a/b/g and part of 802.11n up to 2 spa-
tial streams. SORA utilizes real-time threads to meet the
strict timing requirements of wireless protocols on gen-
eral purpose operating system (Windows).
We build our PACKETSNIPER prototype on top of the
packet decoder in SORA. More specifically, we instruct
the packet decoder to only decode first few bytes of the
packet, which are then used to perform jamming filter
Filter ::= "true" | Predicate | Filter &&
Filter
Predicate ::= x <= const | x >= const
x ::= "length" | "rate" | "header"
Listing 4: BNF Definition of Jamming Filter.
matching. Once a positive jamming decision is made, we
notify the SORA firmware to transmit pre-loaded jam-
ming signal.
Compared to the FPGA implementation on USRP,
SORA introduces additional jamming latency due to the
data exchange between SORA firmware and host CPU,
yet can be potentially used to support latest wireless stan-
dards (e.g., 802.11ac) and MIMO operations.
4.4 Jamming Policy Format
Jamming policy represents the interface between PRO-
TOCOLANALYZER and PACKETSNIPER, and contains
two parts: filter and action. The jamming filter defines
what packets to jam, while the action defines when to
jam the packet. For each packet success/failure sequence
output by PROTOCOLANALYZER, we first convert it into
a mapping from packet filter to a list of actions. Next, we
describe the format of the filter and action respectively.
We note that wireless protocol attributes typically in-
clude certain physical layer properties, such as packet
length and encoding rate, and the packet header that con-
tains source and destination information, type, control
flags and so on. Therefore, we restrict the jamming filters
to these three attributes.
Listing 4 shows the BNF specification of our proposed
filter syntax. A jamming filter is a conjunction of predi-
cates, each of which performs filtering on one of the three
attributes. The length and rate attribute are easy to
understand. There are two points worth noticing about
the header attribute. First, as explained earlier in Sec-
tion 4.1.2, the length of the header represents the trade-
off between filter granularity and jamming latency. Here
we do not use a fixed length but instead make the length
as an configuration parameter at run time. Second, since
the header is a continuous chunk of bytes while the ac-
tual protocol attributes may scatter in different segments
of the headers, a special notation of don’t care byte is
used to skip the non-interested bytes.
The jamming policy also contains a list of actions for
the corresponding jamming filter. The possible actions
are: Jam, Pass, and JamNext. The JamNext action
instructs the PACKETSNIPER to skip the current packet
but jam the next detected packet. This action is intro-
duced to overcome the challenge of jamming short pack-
ets as described in Section 4.1.1. Our observation is
that such short packets (such as acknowledgment or CTS
packets) are typically the response of certain other pack-
ets. Although the short packets themselves are difficult
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to jam, it is easy for the PACKETSNIPER to predict their
transmissions beforehand and sends the jamming signal
as soon as detecting the next packet transmission, with-
out needing to decode its content. We acknowledge that
this action may not cover all cases for short packets, such
as the RTS packet in 802.11.
5 SNIFFER TRACE VERIFICATION
The final step is to validate whether the DUT’s behav-
ior is consistent with the protocol model. We first explain
the need of using sniffer as vantage point for verification
(§ 5.1), then discuss the challenges of sniffer trace veri-
fication and our proposed modeling methods (§ 5.2). Fi-
nally we show how our modeling can be implemented in
UPPAAL (§ 5.3).
5.1 Sniffer as Vantage Point
The broadcast nature of wireless medium makes it pos-
sible to observe the DUT’s packet exchanges from ex-
ternal devices, or wireless sniffers. Using wireless snif-
fer as vantage point is more of a requirement of practi-
cal constraints rather than a design choice. Due to fine-
grained timing requirement in wireless protocols, the im-
plementations are often placed as close as to the hardware
in the form of firmwares. Furthermore, these firmwares
are usually proprietary, making it difficult to instrument
the implementation to collect packet exchange traces or
event logs. Even when such instrumentation capability is
available, the resource constraints in most embedded or
IoT devices make it infeasible to directly collect packet
traces from the devices under test.
As shown in Figure 3, the sniffer can be modeled as
a passive observer (Sniffer1) of the TX(PKT) sig-
nal. Just as regular receivers, the sniffer could also miss
packets, thus there is another switch inside the Sniffer
model. Note that the two switches inside the Medium
and the Sniffer models are independent from each
other. For instance, a packet could be received by the
designating receiver but be missed by the sniffer, and
vice versa. Also note that although we model sniffer
as one logical entity, in practice it may consist of multi-
ple physical sniffer devices and their time-synchronized
traces [10, 4, 23] together form the logical sniffer’s ob-
servation in our model.
5.2 Verifying Sniffer Trace
Given a sniffer trace that represents the implemen-
tation’s behavior, the verification problem is to check
whether it is one of the legal observations of the
Sniffer model. If the answer is no, then a violation
of the protocol can be claimed. On the other hand, how-
ever, a complete protocol compliance can not be declared
1We use “sniffer” to refer to the physical wireless sniffer devices,
and use “Sniffer“ to refer to the model in Figure 3.
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Figure 7: Example of Sniffer Trace Uncertainty.
even if the answer of the verification problem is yes. This
is because a positive answer only means the implementa-
tion could have behaved according to the protocol, but it
is also possible that the implementation violated the pro-
tocol but the violating behavior was missed by the sniffer.
This is known as the sniffer uncertainty problem first de-
scribed by Shi et al. [30].
More specifically, the sniffer may miss packets that
represent protocol violations. Also, the sniffer can not
determine whether an observed packet was actually re-
ceived by the receiver. Figure 7 shows an example of
such uncertainty. Note that the first CLIENT ACK packet
was missed by the client but was received by the sniffer.
A naı¨ve validation of this sniffer trace would report a vi-
olation since the client retransmit the AUTH REQ packet
after receiving the CLIENT ACK packet.
Using sniffer traces for verification, we share the
same limitations with [30] caused by sniffer uncer-
tainty. However, in our formulation, the sniffer un-
certainty is implicitly explored by the model checker
in toggling the two switches inside the Medium and
Sniffer models, whereas it has be to explicitly
expressed using the augmented transitions in [30].
More specifically, a 〈true, false〉 value of the
〈Medium.loss, Sniffer.loss〉 tuple represents
the case when a packet is received by the receiver but
missed by the sniffer. Similarly, a 〈false, true〉
value corresponds to the case when a packet is missed
by the receiver but received by the sniffer.
In verifying sniffer traces in our framework, the model
checker will try all 4 values of the loss variable tuple for
each transmitted packet in the attempt to accept the snif-
fer trace. We argue that by considering sniffer as part of
the model in our formulation, the sniffer uncertainty can
be explored in a systematic manner by an off-the-shelf
model checker rather than a specialized checker [30].
We also note that the number of sniffer losses that the
model checker is allowed to use must be bounded. Other-
wise the model checker will either indefinitely infer pack-
ets missed by the sniffer without making progress on the
actual sniffer trace, or yield artificial traces that contains
too many sniffer losses to be practically meaningful. As
observed in [30], the number of sniffer losses required
for the model checker to accept the trace, denoted as k,
is inversely proportional with the confidence of the trace
correctness. Intuitively, the larger the k, the more miss-
ing packets the model check needs to guess to accept the
8
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1 // sniffer trace to be verified
2 const int LEN = 10;
3 const pkt_t TRACE[LEN] = {...};
4
5 process Sniffer() {
6 bool loss;
7 int idx = 0;
8 state
9 s_init, s_got_pkt;
10 transitions
11 s_init -> s_got_pkt {
12 select i: int [0, 1];
13 sync phy_tx_start?;
14 assign loss = i == 0; },
15 s_got_pkt -> s_init {
16 guard loss; },
17 s_got_pkt -> s_init {
18 guard !loss && idx < LEN &&
19 pkt_in_air == TRACE[idx];
20 assign idx++; }; }
Listing 5: Modeling Sniffer using UPPAAL.
trace, thus less confidence that the trace represents cor-
rect protocol behavior.
5.3 Modeling Sniffer in UPPAAL
Next, we show how the Sniffer model and the snif-
fer trace verification can be done in UPPAAL. The key
idea is to embed the sniffer trace as a constant array, and
assert that the Sniffer model must observe the packets
sequentially.
Listing 5 shows the UPPAAL encoding of the
Sniffer model. A constant array of packets, TRACE,
is defined. The elements and length of the array is popu-
lated from the sniffer trace to be verified. The Sniffer
model taps in the phy tx start signal (L11) to mon-
itor every packet transmission, and non-deterministically
decides whether the transmitted packet was received by
the sniffer or not. The Sniffermodel also maintains an
index to the TRACE array (L7). If the transmitted packet
was received by the sniffer, then it must be the next ex-
pected packet in the sniffer trace (L17). This way, we are
asserting that the Sniffer model should observe the
same packet trace as the physical sniffer. The bound on
number of sniffer loss, which is omitted for sake of space,
can be placed in the guard of the s got pkt→s init
transition (L18).
The verification is then performed by the E<>
Sniffer.idx == LEN query, which states that there
should exist at least one transition path along which the
idx value eventually reaches LEN. If the query is satis-
fied, then the sniffer trace is indeed one of the possible
traces observed by the Sniffer model.
LTS
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OFDM_symbol
SIGNAL
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Events 0us 10us 20us 30us 40us
7.17
15.54
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SIGNAL
Figure 8: Timeline of Various Decoding Stages of
USRP N210 PACKETSNIPER Implementation.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we perform both micro benchmarks on
PACKETSNIPER as well as end-to-end evaluation using
the 802.11 link setup protocol.
6.1 Micro Benchmarks of PACKETSNIPER
6.1.1 Jamming Latency on USRP
As described in Section 4.1.1, one major challenge of
realizing PACKETSNIPER is the critical timing require-
ment: the decoding and filter matching process must be
completed before the end of packet transmission. To
quantify this requirement, we define the Jamming La-
tency as the duration between the beginning of the packet
and the time when the jamming signal is transmitted. The
latency must be shorter than the duration of the packet in
order for the jamming signal to overlap with the packet.
Next, we evaluate the jamming latency on our USRP
N210 prototype implementation of PACKETSNIPER.
Figure 8 shows the timeline of various stages of
the decoding a 6 Mbps 802.11a OFDM packet on the
USRP N210. The power trigger event is triggered
when the receiving power level significantly increases,
and marks the beginning of packet transmission. The
short preamble and long preamble events are
triggered when the presence of short and long preamble
are detected respectively. The latency of these two events
(7.17 µs and 15.54 µs) corresponds to the fact that the
short and long preambles are 8 µs each in duration. For
jamming policies that are only interested in the presence
of a packet (such as the JamNext action), a jamming
decision can be made at this stage, and all following de-
coding steps can be skipped.
The SIGNAL field of the packet, which contains phys-
ical layer properties such as packet length and encoding
rate, is available after 25.61 µs. For jamming filters that
only contain these two attributes, their matching results
can be concluded, and their jamming decision can be
made at this point. No further decoding is required.
The first byte of the packet is available after 37.08 µs
from the beginning of the packet transmission. Depend-
ing on the header length in the jamming filter, more bytes
might be needed to complete the filter matching process.
The incurred extra latency depends on the exact encoding
rate of the packet. The higher encoding rate, the more
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Figure 9: Jamming in Action. The first jam signal was
sent using the JamNext action, while the following two
were using the Jam action.
data bits each OFDM symbol contains, thus the shorter
decoding latency.
To summarize, the jamming latency in our PACKET-
SNIPER implementation can be as short as 8 µs for cer-
tain jamming actions, and as long as 37 µs plus additional
decoding time for jamming filters that contain header
bytes.
Once the jamming decision is made, the jam signal is
asserted and jamming signals are transmitted through the
TX chain. The RX/TX turn-around time on USRP N210
is negligible (in order of nanoseconds) as the RX and TX
chain are independent from each other.
Figure 9 shows the in-phase signals captured during
one jamming session we performed for the 802.11 link
setup protocol. The particular jamming policy was to jam
the acknowledgment packet of the AUTH RESP packet
and all following retransmissions of the AUTH RESP
packet. Since the acknowledgment packets are short, we
utilize the JamNext action to jam the acknowledgment
of the AUTH RESP packet. As can be clearly seen in
Figure 9, the jamming signals, whose magnitudes are sig-
nificantly larger than the original signals, are transmitted
in the middle of packet transmissions. In addition, the
jamming latency for the acknowledgment packet is short
than the two following AUTH RESP’ packets. This is be-
cause the jamming decision was made immediately af-
ter the short preamble detected event for the ac-
knowledgment packet. While for the two AUTH RESP’
packets, the jamming decision was made after 10 header
bytes were decoded.
6.1.2 Jamming Latency on SORA
To measure jamming latency on SORA, we leverage
another radio hardware to capture the jammed packets
over the air. Since jamming signal is LTS, we perform
cross-correlation with LTS to detect both the start of a
jammed packet and the jamming signal. In our experi-
ment, the data packets are transmitted at 6Mbps.
Figure 10 shows CDF of the jamming latency on
SORA for 100 jammed packets. The medium latency is
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Figure 11: Jamming Ratio of PACKETSNIPER Imple-
mentation on USRP N210.
around 70 µs, and is stable within the 70±2 µs range.
Occasionally, jamming latency may jump to 80µs, be-
cause sometimes SORA thread needs to release the CPU
core to prevent from blocking hardware interrupts.
6.1.3 Jamming Capability
Finally, we evaluate PACKETSNIPER’s capability of
jamming packets. We focus on the USRP implemen-
tation since our SORA based prototype is still work in
progress
We set up a transmitter-receiver pair in a conducted
environment, and configure the transmitter to send a con-
stant number (100) of data packets using the ping com-
mand. The transmitter data rate is fixed at 6 Mbps. The
jammer is configured to jam all the non-retransmission
packets from the transmitter. There is no path-loss be-
tween the jammer and the receiver. We then use three
pass-loss values between the transmitter and receiver:
0 dB, 20 dB, 40 dB. In these settings, the RSSIs at the
receiver side are -20 dBm, -40 dBm, -60 dBm respec-
tively. We then vary the transmission power of the USRP
N210 from -10 dBm to 20 dBm with 1 dBm step.
Figure 11 shows the jamming success ratio under the
three path loss settings. As expected, when the RSSI at
the receiver side is low, the jammer can easily jam all
packets even at lowest transmission power. As the RSSI
increases, the required jammer transmission power in-
creases accordingly. After certain cut-off point, the jam-
mer was able to jam nearly all the packets.
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6.2 End-to-End Evaluation
We perform an end-to-end evaluation of our frame-
work through a case study of the 802.11 link setup pro-
tocol. The results show that our framework can increase
state coverage by 2X (§ 6.2.3) and find violations that
otherwise do not manifest (§ 6.2.4).
6.2.1 Protocol Modeling
We first give an overview of our modeling of the
802.11 link setup protocol using UPPAAL. As informally
described in Section 2.1, the protocol consists of three
stages: authentication, association and 802.11X authenti-
cation. Listing 3 shows our modeling of the first authen-
tication stage. We have modeled all three stages using
UPPAAL. The Client model consists of 13 states, and
the AP model consists of 17 states. The full model con-
sists of 544 lines of UPPAAL code, 275 of which are for
the generic T and R modeling.
We then feed the model to PROTOCOLANALYZER.
Among the all possible 221 (13× 17) system states, 73
states are reachable, and 40 reachable states involves
packet failures in their state transition sequence.
6.2.2 Experiment Setup
We use conducted setup for our end-to-end evaluation
to eliminate external interferences. The client and the
AP are put inside RF shield boxes, and their only way of
communication is via a coaxial cable that connects their
antenna ports. We use two TP-LINK WDR3500 routers
as testing devices since they have detachable antennas.
One router is configured in client mode, and the other
is configured in AP mode. Both routers runs OpenWRT
15.05 firmware so that we can remotely control the link
setup process. The source code of OpenWRT is avail-
able, enabling us to examine any potential implementa-
tion bugs we found later.
For each of the 73 jamming policies, we initiate the
link setup process on the client for 10 times, and run the
PACKETSNIPER with corresponding policy during each
link setup session. We utilize the packet log of the PACK-
ETSNIPER as sniffer trace in later verification stage.
6.2.3 State Reachability
We perform verification on the resulting 730 (73×10)
traces using the E<> Sniffer.idx == LEN query
as explained in Section 5.3. A trace is “Accepted” if the
query is satisfied, otherwise is “Rejected”, which repre-
sents potential implementation violations and needs to
be further examined. In addition, we also verify if the
target system state was reached during the verification
(“Reached”).
Table 1 shows the verification results for various k val-
ues. Recall that k is the maximum number of sniffer
Table 1: Summary of Sniffer Trace Verification Re-
sults.
k Accepted Rejected Reached
0 155 575 (79%) 289
2 498 232 (32%) 592
4 617 113 (15%) 699
6 641 89 (12%) 723
8 663 67 (9%) 729
10 665 65 (9%) 729
missed packets that the model checker would tolerate be-
fore rejecting the trace. Overall, we can clearly observe
the trend that when k increases, the model checker ac-
cepts more sniffer traces, and more traces reached the
target system state.
When k = 0, which effectively disables the model
checker’s ability to infer missing packets, 79% of the
traces were rejected. This shows the necessity of toler-
ating sniffer losses in our formulation, as otherwise in-
tensive labor effort is required to examine the rejected
traces to prune out false alarms causes by sniffer missing
packets.
When k = 10, the number of rejected traces reduces
to 65. We inspected these traces and found that main
cause was the device’s internal queueing effect that was
not part of our model (this was a design decision to keep
the model simple). For instance, the client may enqueue
a new round of authentication if the first AUTH REQ
packet was not acknowledged but indeed received by the
AP. This results an interleaving authentication packet se-
quence from the same client, which will be rejected by
the model checker. We also observe several violations
that are potentially caused by implementation misbehav-
iors, which we report later in Section 6.2.4.
Additionally, when k = 10, for 729 out of the 730
traces, the target system state was reached in verifying
the sniffer trace. The only failing trace was caused by
a violation (discussed in § 6.2.4) in the association stage
while the system state is in the following 802.11X au-
thentication stage.
Our framework enables testers to iteratively refine the
verification process. Starting with a high k value, the
tester can narrow down to a small subset of traces that
have high likelihood of violation. After either refining
the original model or identifying true protocol violations,
the tester can then decrease k and repeat the process.
Finally, we performed a set of baseline experiments
without PACKETSNIPER. More specifically, we setup the
client and AP (with antennas) in a normal office envi-
ronment, and performed the association session for 100
times. A regular wireless sniffer was used to collect
traces during the experiment. We observed that only 31
out of the 73 reachable states were reached during verify-
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ing these sniffer traces. In particular, among the 40 states
that require packet losses in their jamming policy, only 6
states were reached in the 100 runs. The results shows
that the PROTOCOLANALYZER and PACKETSNIPER to-
gether can improve state coverage and also provide vali-
dation reproducibility.
6.2.4 Possible Violations Found
We now describe several implementation issues that
cause the sniffer trace to be rejected. We have reported
our findings to the maintainers of corresponding software
module, and briefly summarize them here.
Association Without Authentication. We found if the
first AUTH RESP packet was received by the client but
the acknowledgment and all following retransmissions of
AUTH RESP were jammed, the AP still accepted the fol-
lowing ASSOC REQ packet from the client. We origi-
nally thought the AP should have rejected the associa-
tion request since the AUTH RESP packet failed, thus au-
thentication failed as well. After communicating with the
maintainer of hostapd, we realized this corner case was
covered in the latest 802.11 2016 standard, which states
the AP considers the client as authenticated as soon as re-
ceiving the AUTH REQ packet from the client. We were
previously referring to the 802.11 2012 standard, which
did not describe this case clearly.
Double Association. When the acknowledgment of the
ASSOC REQ packet and all of its retransmissions were
jammed, the client sent a new ASSOC REQ despite hav-
ing received the ASSOC RESP from the AP. This is be-
cause from the client’s point of view, the ASSOC REQ
packet failed, thus it restarted the association process.
However, the reception of the ASSOC RESP packet in-
dicates that the AP actually received the ASSOC REQ
packet, thus should have shortcut client’s next associa-
tion attempt.
802.11X Deadlock. When the acknowledgment of
the first ASSOC RESP and all its retransmissions were
jammed, the AP claimed the association step failed and
would not continue to the 802.11X authentication stage.
However, the client actually received the ASSOC RESP
packet and was waiting for the AP to initiated the 802.11
authentication step. Thus the client and the AP entered a
deadlock state.
7 RELATED WORK
Industry practice: Wireless protocols are typically
tested both in a conducted setup and over-the-air. Con-
ducted tests provide a controlled environment. However,
even for a conducted setup, we are unaware of any com-
mercially available attenuators that can selectively trigger
packet drops. This was corroborated in our conversations
with Wi-Fi chip companies. The latency of existing vari-
able attenuators is in the order of 10s of milliseconds,
while we need micro-second latencies to trigger single
packet drop, as achieved by PACKETSNIPER. Over-the-
air tests are run to stress the entire RF subsystem includ-
ing the antenna in a realistic setup. However, these tests
are left running for days to get the appropriate test scenar-
ios to be triggered, and the test time can be significantly
shortened by PACKETSNIPER.
Protocol verification: There has been work on model
checking network protocol implementations [25, 18].
The problem is different when trying to verify wireless
systems, because (i) it is non-trivial to trigger all possible
states in wireless systems, and (ii) there is uncertainty
in the output captured by the wireless sniffer. Wireless
sniffers have been widely used to analyze MAC behavior
in enterprise wireless networks [29, 33, 35, 36, 10, 23].
However, this body of research assumes correctness of
the protocol implementation while finding anomalies,
while VERIFI uses the sniffers to verify the implemen-
tation.
Model-based testing and validation: Model-based test-
ing (MBT) is the approach of generating test cases by
exploring the model of a system under test [34]. Appli-
cations of MBT differ in the modeling approach (UML,
Statechart, first-order logic), the use of test-case gener-
ation strategies (model checking, theorem proving) and
the application domains (automotive, distributed systems
etc.). One can view our approach as the first instance of
the approach where we use model checker to explore the
model to construct jamming policy that is used in con-
junction with the PACKETSNIPER to drive the wireless
system into interesting states. Our trace validation prob-
lem is also more complex due to the presence of uncer-
tainty in observations. Similar problem happens when
validating sampled traces in the context of runtime ver-
ification [7, 19, 3, 16]. We incorporate the sniffer trace
uncertainty problem [30] but our new formulation allows
leveraging any model checker instead of a customized
checker (as in [30]).
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Testing of wireless protocols is typically cumbersome
and incomplete. These systems are left running for sev-
eral hours to ensure that the system does not exhibit ab-
normal behavior. This takes a long time, and often bugs
are not found until after the product is released. In this
paper we present VERIFI, a new automatic framework
for validating wireless protocol implementation. We have
described the design of VERIFI, and provided implemen-
tations based on UPPAAL model checker and Software
Defined Radio platforms (USRP and SORA). We have
evaluated our system via both micro benchmarks and an
end-to-end cast study on the Wi-Fi link setup protocol,
and showed that VERIFI can improve validation cover-
age and reproducibility.
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We believe we have only scratched the surface in using
formal methods to validate wireless protocol implemen-
tations. Our techniques could be further used for other
applications as well, such as testing the security aspects
of wireless protocols. Moving forward, we are working
in two directions in the near term. First, we are extending
the approach to detect timing errors. Second, we are ex-
tending VERIFI such that it can work for other wireless
protocols, such as a frequency-hopping Bluetooth, or a
FDD cellular system.
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